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THE ATTITUDE OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF PENN-
SYLVANIA TOWARDS THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW.
The Negotiable Instruments Law has been adopted in forty-
seven States, Territories, the District of Columbia and the Insular
Possessions of the United States. Since its adoption in these
various jurisdictions the writer has gathered, analyzed and card
catalogued one thousand and ninety-one cases determinable under
its provisions in those jurisdictions. In three hundred and
eighty-seven of these cases, thirty-five and forty-seven hundredths
per cent., the Act was ignored, as well as the cases under it.
The writer does not mean that in all those cases the de-
cisions were contrary to the provisions of the Act. In some of
them it was, but it has not seemed to him to be a part of his duty
to determine which were erroneous. Whether they were right
or wrong, he contends that in every case where the Act clearly
states a principle that governs the case before the court (always
supposing, of course, that the Act is in force in that jtrisdiction)
ithe Act should be cited as the true source of authority. The
fact that this is a uniform law, a code for all the States, makes
this all the more imperative. If the particular section or sec-
tions applicable to the particular case are contrary to prior statu-
tory provision or prior judicial decision in that State, it is clear
(407)
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that the Act is the real source of authority. The writer contends
that it is equally the real source of authority even when the prin-
ciple thus enunciated happens to be the same already in force in
that jurisdiction. How can it be contended that the Act is the
source of authority in one case and not in the other? It is only by
maintaining it as the source of authority in all cases that we can
hold our profession (including judges and lawyers) to one in-
variable course of examining, and citing the particular sections of
the Act and also the cases under those sections in other jurisdic-
tions and thus secure uniformity in decisions and the growth of a
new body of precedents. To depart from this rule, to allow judges
and lawyers to ignore the Act and the decisions under it, and to
indulge in the common habit of adhering to 'some notion peculiar
to that particular jurisdiction-the result will be dissonance and a
gradual divergence from uniformity in decisions inv61ving the
same question in different jurisdictions.
It should hardly be necessary to state that while thus inter-
preting and applying the Act and the decisions under it, the
examination of old cases and old text books (meaning those
antedating the adoption of the Act) for purposes of elucidation
or illustration or for tracing the history and development of the
particular principle in question, is always in order. But it cannot
be too strenuously insisted that when the law is put in the form
of a .concise code and particularly when that code is intended
and is adopted for the express purpose of bringing into harmony
the varying law of different jurisdictions, the source of author-
ity is the code and the cases under it, and the prior law is super-
seded by the code even though it makes no change in the prior
law in that State or jurisdiction. It is confusing, misleading and
a source of future error and divergence from the uniform law
not to cite it and the cases under it in point, in every case, whether
the uniform law changes the law in the particular jurisdiction, or
whether it does not change it.
Whenever an opinion ignores the Act and the cases there-
under, and cites old decisions of its own State, it encourages
the tendency to continue local development of juristic conceptions
and rules of limited sphere, instead of encouraging the develop-
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ment of juristic conceptions and rules uniform throughout the
country and therefore national in scope.
Since the adoption of the Act in Pennsylvania I some fifty
cases have arisen in that State under its provisions. The object
of this article is to examine the attitude of the Bench and Bar
of that State, distinguished for the learning and the ability of
her lawyers, towards this law. To do this, these cases must be
examined.
Homewood People's Bank v. Heckert.
2
In an action by the payee against the maker, an affidavit of
defense tending to show that the note was not to be paid until
certain buildings were sold and that they had been sold was held
to state evidence that was not admissible because it would vary
the terms of the written agreement. But query, does this rule
of evidence apply, the suit being between the parties to a nego-
tiable instrument not intended by them to take effect until a cer-
tain event? See Sections 91, 98 (52, 59)1 not cited by the court.
Chambers v. McLean.
4
Upon suit by the payee of a negotiable promissory note
against the two makers thereof, it is no defense by one of the
makers that he signed the note at the request of the payee and
for her accommodation and without consideration from the
payee. Sections 54-55 (28-29) were applied, but no cases under
the Act were cited. At this time, 1903, although it was only
two years after the adoption of the Act in Pennsylvania, the fol-
lowing cases which are cited in the notes had arisen under Sec-
tion 55 (29) in other jurisdictions. 5
1 Act of May j6, Igoi, P. L. 194.
'207 Pa. 231 (1903).
' The section numbers first given are those of the New York Act, as more
cases arise in the courts of New York than in other States. The section num-
bers next given are those of the Act as adopted by its framers.
424 Pa. Super. Ct. 567 (9o3).
'Bankers' Iowa State Bank v. Mason Hand Lathe Co., go N. W. 612
(Iowa, 1902), not citing the Act; Bank of Monticello v. Dooley, 113 Wisc.
590 (1902), citing §55 (29) ; Fleetman v. Ashley, 6o A. D. 201 (N. Y. 19Ol),
ignoring the Act; Howard v. Van Gieson, 5o A. D. 127 (N. Y. igoo), not
citing §55 (29), although citing other sections of the Act; State Bank of
Chicago v Carr, 13o N. C. 479 (19o2), ignoring the Act; Strickland v. Henry,
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Milton National Bank v. Beaver.6
A promissory note, otherwise negotiable in form but con-
taining a provision authorizing a confession of judgment before
maturity, is non-negotiable under Section 24 (5). Section 320
(184) should also have been cited.
Neil v. Neil.t
A co-partner R. signed his name to a judgment note leav-
ing the name of the payee blank and delivered the note to his
co-partner N. to be signed by him and used to raise money f6r
the firm. N. signed the note, inserted his own name as payee
and delivered it to the plaintiff in exchange for another note for
a larger sum which N. had discounted and appropriated the pro-
ceeds to his own use. The court held that the case should be
ruled by the doctrine that where one of two innocent parties must
suffer a loss, it must be sustained by the one whose conduct,
although blameless, caused the loss, and that C. cannot recover
from R. and N.; citing old cases and Story's Equity as authori-
ties, instead of citing Section 91 (52) and casis decided there-
under.
Whenever possible, cases concerning negotiable instruments
should be determined under the rules of the law merchant and
not under the rules of estoppel, nor of equity.
Siegel v. Hirsch.
8
Facts stated held to be sufficient to warrant a conclusion of
law that due notice of dishonor had been given to an indorser.
Sections 55, 176 and 177 (29, 105, lo8) were cited, but no cases
under them were referred to.
It is asked why cases in other jurisdictions under the same
sections should have been cited unless the interpretation and appli-
66 A. D. 23 (N. Y. igoi), citing §55 (29), but the decision was reversed, 175
N. Y. 372 (I9O3), on the erroneous ground that the case should have gone to
the jury to determine whether it was accommodation paper; for that was im-
material, see §55 (29). Several cases decided in 1903 are not included in
this list. No cases had arisen by 19o3 under §iio (6o).
125 Pa. Super. 494 (I9O4).
T 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 6o5 (i9o4).
a26 Pa. Super. Ct. 398 (I9O4).
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cation of those sections is doubtful? It is enough to state ih
reply that their interpretation and application was considered
doubtful enough to warrant counsel to bring suit to determine
them.
Rathfon v. Locher.9
A note by a married woman for-her husband's accommoda-
tion, although legally invalid, imports a moral consideration.
This was held to be enough to support a note in renewal
given by her after her husband's death. The fact that the note
was dated before her husband's death, was held not to matter,
tinder Section 31 (12), it not having been done for an illegal
or fraudulent purpose. Section 51 (25), which provides that
"an antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value" should also
have been cited.
Kensington Natiolzal Bank v. Ware.10
In an action against co-partners as indorsers of a note, an
affidavit of defense by one partner that he had no notice of pro-
test (meaning notice of dishonor) and that such notice had been
fraudulently suppressed by his partner was held to be insufficient;
citing Section 170 (99), but not citing Traders' National Bank
v. Jones," a prior decision under this section.
Garman v. Guinbiner.1
2
Upon suit brought on a note, an affidavit of defense aver-
ring that the payee had failed to complete according to contract
the work for which the note was given, and that the plaintiff,
the indorsee of the note, took it with full knowledge of the
failure of consideration, is sufficient.
The Act was not cited.' 3 In this as in many other cases it
is not, as stated previously, the correctness of the decision that
'215 Pa. 571 (19o6).
3032 Pa. Super. Ct. 247 (i9o6).
"1 o4 App. Div. 433 (N. Y. 1905).
3 Pa. Super. Ct. 181 (19o6).
" See §§i, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 (52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59), and the scores of
cases that had been decided thereunder by this time.
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is questioned, but the failure to cite the real source of authority,
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, and the decisions
under it.
Burgettstown National Bank v. Nill.14
Where the indorser of a note indorses on the note a waiver
of protest or demand of payment eighteen months after maturity,
with knowledge that no demand for payment had been made, he
is bound by the waiver and is liable on the note as indorser. The
court concluded:
"It is manifest therefore, that, from the nature of the in-
dorser's contract, a new consideration is not required to support
a waiver of protest before or after maturity of the paper."
The Act was not cited.15 But inasmuch as the real point in-
volved is explicitly determined by the express terms of the law
on the statute book, why spend time in discussing old cases that
plainly showed a lack of knowledge of the principles of the law
merchant and saturation of mind with the common law doctrine
of consideration not applicable in cases under the law merchant?
Diffenbachers' Estate.16
Knowledge by the holder for value that the defendant is
an accommodation indorser is no defense, citing many old Penn-
sylvania cases, but ignoring the law of the State, Section 55 (29)
and all the cases under it.
Chatham National Bank v. Gardner.17
When a note shows on its face the name of a limited part-
nership association and the note is signed by two individuals, one
as secretary and one as treasurer, the note is deemed to be that
of the association and not of the individuals who signed it; citing
and following Section 39 (2o), but citing no cases under it.'8
1"213 Pa. 456 (19o6).
" See §§i8o, I8I, 182 (lO9, 110, II).
"3I Pa. Super. Ct. 35 (i9o6).
1T31 Pa. Super. Ct. 135 (I9o6).
'"In the case of Daniel v. Glidden, 38 Wash. 556 (igos), the note was
headed in print with the name of a corporation and was signed by one de-
fendant as secretary, and by the other as president. It was held [after citing
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Marshall v. Sonneman.19
A notice of dishonor of a note and of its protest, directed
to one of two indorsers and delivered to the second indorser,
is not enough to hold such a second indorser; citing old cases
and old text books, but not mentioning the Act.
Counsel for appellee claimed that such a notice is "entirely
within the requirements of the negotiable instruments law," but
without citing any specific section. See Section 167 (96) under
which it would seem that as the second indorser had notice which
sufficiently identified the instrument and indicated that it had
been dishonored by non-payment 20 the indorser was liable. What
difference does it make to whom it was addressed, so long as the
indorser sought to be charged had actual notice of dishonor? The
words "the holders look to you for the payment thereof" are
superfluous, not being required by the Act.
Birmingham Iron Foundry v. Regnery.21
In an action against an alleged indorser of the note of a
corporation of which he was President, who added "Prest" after
his signature, evidence is admissible under Section 39 (2o) to
show that his intention to bind the corporation only, was known
by the plaintiff.
Hatboro National Bank v. Stevenson.22
In an action by the last indorser of a note against the maker,
the note being payable to the maker's order, an affidavit of de-
fense is sufficient alleging that the defendant indorsed and deliv-
§39 (20) and claiming to follow it. but as the note was non-negotiable the
provisions of the Act are not applicable] that the name of no principal was
disclosed, and the name of the corporation printed at the top of the note
formed no part thereof. It might as well be contended that a printed letter-
head or a printed promissory note with the name of the place printed instead
of being written, does not disclose where the note was made or filled in; or
that the printed part of a date (1gi ) filled in so as to read (19Io) does
not disclose the date: or as the figures in print form no part of the note, the
date of the note was the year o; or was undated.
"216 Pa. 65 (i9o6).
"o The language used in §167 (96).
=33 Pa. Super. Ct. 54 (1907).
33 Pa. Super. Ct. i44 (9o7).
414 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ered the note to the second indorsee and that the plaintiff was not
the owner of the note, but that he brought suit for the use and
benefit of the second indorsee to deprive the defendant of his
just defense and to prevent him from setting off against the pay-
ment of the note an amount claimed to be due from the second
indorsee to the defendant. The Act was not cited.
23
Whitman v. First National Bank.
24
The drawee receiving a cheque drawn upon itself without
sufficient funds to the drawer's credit to meet it, making an
effort to induce the drawer to make his account good, and tele-
graphing notice of dishonor that day to its correspondent in a
distant city, is not liable to the holder because it did not protest
the cheque until the next day. The Act was not cited. 25 The cor-
rectness of the course pursued by the bank is more evident upon
citation of these sections of the law upon the statute book of
the State.
Link v. Bergdoll.
26
In an action on a note against an indorser, an affidavit of
defense stating that no notice of the dishonor or protest of said
note was given to this deponent by the plaintiffs . . . is
enough to put the plaintiff to proof before a jury. The Act was
not cited, but see Section i6o (89). As before stated, under
Section 189 (118), while protest is permissible, it is not requisite
except in the case of foreign bills of exchange. This is so often
overlooked by the courts of many States besides those in Penn-
sylvania that it calls for particular notice.
State Bank of Pittsburgh v. Kirk.
2
T
Where the directors of a bank whose capital is impaired,
make their notes to the bank, to take the place of certain bad
loans, with an understanding that these directors' notes are to be
paid out of profits, and the bank fails, the directors cannot set
" See §§91 to 98 (52 to 59).
2435 Pa. Super. Ct. 125 (1907).
2'See §§74, I85 (4), 189 (103), 114 (4), 118.
"'35 Pa. Super. Ct. 155 (197o).
2216 Pa. 452 (197o).
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up want of consideration, on being sued on their notes by the
receiver of the bank.
The Act was not cited, the court resting its opinion on
estoppel. But see Section 51 (25) under which there was a valid
consideration, constituting value, for the directors' notes taken
in gradual extinguishment of bad loans. By thus ignoring the
law and citing only old cases (by which is meant cases decided
before the adoption of the Act) the benefit was lost of all the
cases decided under that law.
Allentown National Bank v. Clay Product Supply Co. 28
Where a bank accepts from a debtor a negotiable promis-
sory note indorsed by the debtor and extends time to him, credit-
ing his account with the proceeds, receipting and surrendering
bills of lading pledged as collateral, there being nothing to con-
nect the bank with what took place between the original parties
to the note, the bank is not only a holder for value, but is also
a holder in due course, being without notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or of any right of set-off in connection therewith.
The Act was not mentioned; but see Sections 51 and 91 (25
and 52). By this time (1907) twenty-four cases had arisen
under Section 51 (25) and thirty-nine cases under Section 91
(52). The law itself not being cited all these sixty-three cases
were also ignored.
Lindsay v. Dutton.
29
In an action on a note against the maker, an affidavit of
defense that the indorsement was after maturity with full notice
of the maker's defense, will only avail the defendant so far as he
may have a defense against the payee. The Act was not cited;
but see the Sections 91 to 98 (52 to 59).
First National Bank of York v. Diehl.30
Where a payee agrees with one of several indorsers that if
such indorser will pay the note sued on as soon as possible or at
most within sixty days, other notes of that indorser will be ex-
=217 Pa. 128 (1907).
=217 Pa. 148 ('9o7).
"218 Pa. 588 (iqo7).
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tended, the note in suit having been duly protested and notice of
dishonor having been given to all the indorsers, none of the
indorsers are released. Mere delay in enforcing collection after
maturity, the liability of the indorsers having become fixed, will
not discharge the indorsers. The Act was not cited, but see Sec-
tions 200, 201 (119, 120).
Provident Securities and Banking Co. v. First National Bank of
Gallitzin.31
Section 225 (37) cited and followed, imposes a statutory
duty on the drawee of a bill of exchange or cheque to return it to
the holder, accepted or non-accepted, within twenty-four hours
after delivery to the drawee, unless the drawee allows a longer
period, and the failure so to return it renders the drawee liable
as an acceptor, following the law as determined in Wisner v.
First National Bank of. Gallitin.
8 2
This section of the Act was much discussed in the contro-
versy between Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School and
others.8
Croyle v. Guelich,3.
Citing a statute of 188i,35 it was held that an acceptance of
a bill of exchange must be in writing, ignoring the later and
therefore the real source of authority, the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, Section 220 (132).
Under the Act of i881 a bill of exchange for less than
twenty dollars may be accepted orally. Under Section 220 (132)
even an acceptance of such a bill must be in writing. Surely it
cannot be claimed that the Act of 1881 is the law as to the accept-
ance of bills of exchange for less than twenty dollars! It is
Section 220 (132) that is the law in every case of an acceptance
of a bill, and not the law of 188x, whether the bill be for less
than, or more than, twenty dollars.
a37 Pa. Super. Ct. 7 (198o).
"220 Pa. 21 (i9o8).
"See, Brannan on the Negotiable Instruments Law (2nd Ed.), p. 162.
'*35 Pa. Super. Ct. 356 (Igo8).
Act of May xo, P. L. I7.
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Flanders v. Snare.6
There is nothing in the Act, Sections 6o, 6i, 23, 36 (30, 3,
4, i7), cited and followed, that prevents the use of a rubber
stamp in the indorsement of negotiable instruments.
Stouffer v. Kelchner.87
In the absence of evidence of fraud impeaching the title of
one suing on bills of exchange the offer in evidence of the bills,
with their indorsements, makes out a prima facie case, and the
plaintiff is not required to show that he is an innocent holder for
value before maturity.
Why not cite Section 98 (59) instead of "the rules of prac-
tice in the court below" as the source of authority?
Johnson Co. v. Koch.88
The purchaser of negotiable paper in due course of business,
for value before maturity, without notice of any ground of de-
fence by the acceptor, is entitled to a verdict directed for him.
Although the Act was not referred to by counsel (so far
as the report shows), the court cited and followed Sections 90,
91 and 95 (51, "52, 56).
Cunningham v. First National Bank of Indiana.9
Where a cheque is paid on a forged indorsement and the
drawer delays six weeks in giving notice thereof to the drawee,
the drawer cannot recover from the bank the amount of the loss,
the bank in which the cheque was first deposited having mean-
time failed. Sections 42, 112 (23, 62) should have been cited,
but were not, so far as the report indicates.
Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers & Mechs. Bank.4
0
The law was here laid down as to the absence of any con-
tractual relationship between the payee of an unaccepted cheque
s 137 Pa. Super. Ct 28 (ipo8).
"38 Pa. Super. Ct. 475 (i9o8).
N 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 553 (1908).
"219 Pa. 310 (i9o8).
" 220 Pa. i (I98).
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and the bank on which the cheque is drawn, ignoring the fact
that such is the statute law of the State under Section 325 (189).
The defendant bank cashed cheques on other banks on
forged indorsements of the plaintiff payee's name, paying the
several amounts to the plaintiff's 'bookkeeper who absconded.
The defehdant bank then collected the amounts of the cheques
through the clearing house. It was held that the plaintiff, as de-
positor in the defendant bank, has no right of action to recover
such moneys as moneys received for the depositor's benefit.
Section 42 (23) was not cited.
Wisner v. First National Bank of GallitZin.
4
Presentation for acceptance is a demand for acceptance,
which, if the bill is retained by the drawee, implies a demand for
its return, if acceptance is declined. Mere failure to return the
bill within twenty-four hours, is acceptance and a cheque is
subject to the same rules.
Sections 220, 224, 225, 321 (132, 136, 137, 185) were cited
and two cases under the Act, State Bank v. Weiss,4 2 and B. & 0.
R. Co. v. First National Bank.43 At this time, 19o8, seven cases
had arisen under Section 220 (32) ; one case had arisen under
Section 224 (136); and eleven cases had arisen under Section
321 (i85).
Bank of Morehead v. Hernig.
44
A plaintiff suing on a note is put to proof of the bona fides
of the transaction when the affidavit of defence avers that the
plaintiff took the note after notice of the payee's defective title,
and that no consideration or but little consideration passed.
The Act was not mentioned by counsel but was referred to
in the opinion, without stating, however, what sections are appli-
cable or citing any of the scores of cases by this time, 19o8, de-
cided thereunder in the States where the Act was in force.
45
'1220 Pa. 21 (igo8).
"91 N. Y. S. 276 (19o4).
4 1o2 Va. 753 (904).
"220 Pa. 224 (igo8).
"See §§gr, 93, 94, 95, 96 and 98 (52, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 59).
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McNeeley Co. v. Bank of North America.
46
Upon suit by a depositor against the bank in which the de-
posits were made, payments having been made by the bank of
cheques on this account which were forgeries, a delay of three
months in giving notice to the bank by the drawer, after discov-
ery of such forgeries and payments, will deprive the depositor
of his right to recover.
Counsel for the appellee relied on the old leading case of
Price v. Neal,41 and old cases in the Supreme Court of the United
States and of Pennsylvania, but failed to cite Section 42 (23)
or any cases under it. The opinion ignored the Act.4"
Snyder v. Corn National Bank.
49
Where a clerk having unlimited power of attorney to draw
cheques against his employer's account, draws cheques to the
order of one having no business relation with such employer, and
then forges the name of such person as indorser and the bank
pays the cheque, the depositing employer cannot recover the
amount of the cheques from the bank, under Section 28 (9).
The payee of such cheques is a fictitious person within the mean-
ing of this section. Being therefore payable to bearer, the forg-
ery of the fictitious payee's name has no bearing, so far as the
liability of the bank is concerned.
Ott v. Seward.50
On page 632 of the opinion it is stated that:
"... the defense that the appellant was a mere accommo-
dation indorser for them, to enable them to raise money on the
notes, is absolutely barren of merit. Professional zeal hardly
excuses the attempt to make it."
46 221 Pa. 588 (1968).
413 Burr. 1354 (Eng. 1762).
"The depositor was precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority (in the language of the section) by his negligence in asserting his
rights. See Cunningham v. First National Bank of Indiana, 219 Pa. 310
(9o8), the Act not cited; Murphy v. Met. Nat. Bk., 191 Mass. 159 (io6), the
Act not cited. Counsel arguing the case cited Price v. Neal, yet failed to cite
§112 (62), which is founded on Price v. Neal.
49221 Pa. 599 (1908).
"*221 Pa. 630 (iso8).
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Why did not the court go further and say that under the
law of the State, the Negotiable Instrument Law, Section 55
(29), the accommodation indorser was liable to a holder for
value, even though the holder at the time of taking the instru-
ment knew him to be only an accommodation party?
It would have been well to add to this some of the numerous
decisions in cases arising under this section.
But the Act and all the cases under this section were ignored.
Savings Institution of the City of Williamsport v. Folk.51
An indorser of a cheque is liable upon his indorsement, to
the bank cashing the cheque, though the bank sent the cheque
for collection through its usual channels and it was returned un-
paid, one of the intermediate banks having entered up a judg-
ment note against the maker and having attached the maker's
deposit before the cheque was received by the bank on which it
was drawn.
While old Pennsylvania cases were cited, the Act was not
cited; but see Section 116 (66).
National Bank of Phoenixvill v. Bonsor.52
When a bank makes advances or gives further credit on the
faith of a negotiable instrument deposited with it by a customer,
for collection, he having been credited therewith, it is entitled to
a lien thereon and on its proceeds for the amount thus advanced.
Sections 53 and 2 (27 and 191) were cited; but not one of the
six cases that by this time, i909, had arisen under Section
53 (27). 5
Murray v. Real Estate Title Ins. & Trust Co.
5 4
Here examination is made of the duty of a depositor in a
bank to give prompt notice to the bank upon finding out that it
'138 Pa. Super. Ct. 54 (i9og).
2 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 275 (i9o9).
"The six cases referred to are: Payne v. Zell, 98 Va. 294 (i9oo) ; Brooks
v. Sullivan, 129 N. C. igo (igoi); Black v. First National Bank, 96 Md. 399
(i9o3); Mersick v. Alderman, 77 Conn. 6 34 (i9o5); Bank of Montreal v.
Howard, 44 Wash. io (igo6), and Graham v. Snutte, 155 Mich. 65 (i9o8).
"439 Pa. Super Ct. 438 (igo9).
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has paid and charged to his account a cheque with a forged sig-
nature.
There is no doubt as to the correctness of the principle laid
down, but why did not the court cite Section 4 (i93) of the stat-
ute instead of relying upon McNeeley v. Bank of North Amer-
ica?55 The fact that the principle established is the same in both
should make no difference. The statute, when there is one, should
be cited as the source of authority, with the cases under it, either
in that or in other jurisdictions, and lastly, if deemed necessary,
prior decisions may be cited, to show what change, or that no
change, has been made by the Act. Seven cases had arisen by
this time, i9o , under this section. As the Act was not cited,
none of these cases were hunted upand cited.5 6
Zollner v. Moffitt.
57
Due notice of dishonor is deemed to have been given to a
defendant indorser when it is shown that the notice was properly
addressed and deposited in the post office, under Sections 167,
176 (96, 105). Such a notice may be verbal or written and no
special form is necessary.
Schultheis v. Sellers.58
Where fraud in the inception of a note is shown by the de-
fendant maker, the burden is cast upon the indorsee of establish-
ing the fact that he is a holder in due course, even though he
makes out a prima facie case by putting the instrument in evi-
dence.
"Supra, note 47.
It is conceded that when no light is thrown on a case by cases under
the same section in other jurisdictions, there is good excuse for not citing
them. But on the vexed question of "reasonable time," the only way to
arrive at a national conception on the subject, is by examining all cases
in other jurisdictions bearing in any way upon what is "reasonable time."
As to cases construing what is a reasonable time under §4 (193), see: Com-
mercial Nat. Bk. v. Zimmerman, i85 N. Y. 210 (I9o6); Gordon v. Levine,
194 Mass. 418 (19o7); and i97 Mass. 267 (r9o8); Mfg. Co. v. Summers, i43
N. C. 102 (i9o6).
o222 Pa. 644 (ipog).
"223 Pa. 513 (I909).
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Section 98 (59) was correctly cited as authority, but no
case under it was mentioned. Neither counsel cited the Act, so
far as the report shows.
Lowry National Bank v. Hazard.59
In an action by an indorsee against the maker of a note an
affidavit of defence setting up alleged misrepresentations by the
payee to the maker, being merely statements of intention by the
maker, as inducement for the note, were held insufficient to pre-
vent judgment for the indorsee. The Act was not cited.
Why did not the court go further and hold that to put the
indorsee upon proof that he was a holder for value under Sec-
tions 9 I , 98 (52, 59) the affidavit of defense must show (under
Section 95 (56) that the indorsee had actual knowledge of the
facts alleged and that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith? By ignoring these sections of the Act
the benefit of hundreds of decisions thereunder was lost.
Hannon v. Allegheny Bellevue Land Co.60
Where a cheque was given at 1.30 P. M., but was not pre-
sented for payment until the third day thereafter, which was one
day after failure of the bank the cheque was drawn on, all
the parties and the bank being in the same city, the delay in pre-
sentment for payment was held to be unreasonable. Sections 321,
322, 130 (i85), I86, 214) were cited, but none of the cases de-
cided thereunder.
Morrison v. Whitfield.61
An indorsee who takes a note for an antecedent debt, is a
holder for value.
Counsel for the appellant made this claim on their brief, but
instead of citing Section 51 (25) and the decisions under it as
their authority, they cited two old Pennsylvania cases. The court,
in its opinion, cited Section 5i (25), but none of the decisions
under it.
s223 Pa. 520 (1909).
W44 Pa. Super. Ct. 266 (i9io).
6146 Pa. Super. Ct. IO3 (IgI).
ATTITUDE TOWARDS NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 423
Upon comparison of this decision with that in State Bank
of Pittsburgh v. Kirk,6 2 it appears that the higher court ignored
the law and rested its decision on erroneous grounds, while the
lower court cited the law (though not the cases under it) and
followed it, even though counsel failed to cite it.
Grange'Trust Co. v. Brown.
2a
An indorser's signature followed merely by "Agt" leaves
the indorser personally liable. The court cited as its authority
Sharpe v. Belles, 2b instead of citing the real authority, Section 39.
Neyens v. Port.63
A request or order for goods, concluding with what by itself
would be a negotiable note, is not a negotiable instrument under
Sections 22, 23 (3, 4). Section 20 (I) should also have been
cited.
Falconi v. Magee.6 4
The defendant, an attorney, collected eight hundred dollars
for the plaintiff, his client, deposited it in a bank to his own
credit, drew a cheque for the amount to the order of the plaintiff,
placed it. in a sealed envelope and sent it to the plaintiff in care
of one to whose address he had been instructed to send it by his
client. This person opened the envelope, forged the plaintiff's
name as payee, collected and appropriated the proceeds. The
attorney was held to be liable to his client, as the attorney can
recover from the bank that paid the cheque on the forged endorse-
ment; citing Sections 42 (23), but. not citing any case under it.65
Volk v. Shoemaker."6
Citing Section 20 (i), it was held that a bond otherwise
negotiable in form, authorizing entry of judgment at any time,
is not negotiable.
6 7
"Supra, note 28.
'a 4 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 274 (t91).
eb61 Pa. 69 (i869).
"46 Pa. Super. Ct. 428 (igi).
"47 Pa. Super. Ct. 56o (191).
"The writer has collected thirty-six cases on this section.
"229 Pa. 407 (1911).
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Second National Bank of Pittsburgh v. HoffmanA5
In an action against the indorser of a note where the de-
fendant shows that the note was procured from him by fraud of
the maker, the burden is on the plaintiff to show affirmatively
that it was an innocent purchaser for value.
Sections 94, 95 (58, 59) were cited by the court, although
not cited by counsel, but no case under the Act was cited in the
decision. Counsel cited cases indiscriminately whether before or
after the adoption of the Act in Pennsylvania.
Alldred's Estate (No. 1). 9
Where directors of a corporation indorse its notes for the
benefit of the corporation before delivery, and afterwards accept
the benefits of a deed of trust of the corporation's property to
indemnify them against loss as such indorsers, they become prin-
cipals, and cannot rely on the defence of non-presentment and
lack of notice of dishonor. The Act was not cited on this aspect
of the case, but see Sections 130, I8o, 186 (70, 109, 115) and
O'Bannon Co. v. Curran.
7 0
It was held, further, that the signature of one not otherwise
a party, in blank, before delivery, makes the signer an indorser;
changing the law in Pennsylvania. Section 114 (64) was cited. 71
"See Wisconsin Yearly Meeting &c. v. Babler, 115 Wise. 289 (1902) not
cited by the court.
.s229 Pa. 429 (IgII).
eo229 Pa. 627 (1911).
20 129 A. D. go (N. Y. 19o8). Contra, but not to be commended, Mc-
Donald v. Luckenbach, 17o Fed. Rep. 434 (199o). See also Mercantile Bk.
of Memphis v. Busby, 12o Tenn. 652 (igo8), in which, while following the
old law in Tennessee, the court went far afield in taking into consideration
how many shares of the capital stock each indorser owned, and what the
defendants understood, without inquiring whether the holder of the note
understood so also.
" See: Cohn v. The Cons. Butter & Egg Co., 30 Misc. 725 (N. Y. igoo);
Far Rockaway Bk. v. Norton, 186 N. Y. 484 (19o6); Baumeister v. Kuntz,
42 So. 886 Fla. (19o7); Deaney v. Choquet, 27 R. I. 338 (19o7); Dollar Sgs.
Bk. v. Barberton Pottery Co., 117 Ohio Decs. 539 (1907); Rockfield v. First
Nat. Bk., 77 Ohio St. 311 (19o7); Gibbs v. Guaragha, 75 N. J. L. 168 (i9o7);
Haddock, Blanchard & Co. v. Haddock, 192 N. Y. 409 (19o8); Roessle v.
Lancaster, 13o A. D. i (N. Y. i9og) ; Thorpe v. White, 188 Mass. 333 (19o5) ;
Walker v. Dunham, 135 Mo. App. 396 (igog), in which the Act was cited.
How is it possible to follow the Act, as to part of a case, and to ignore it,
as to another part of the same case?
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First National Bank v. McBride.7
2
In an action on a note against an accommodation indorser,
the declaration stating that the note was not paid at maturity,
due presentation and demand having been made, that the defend-
ant had due notice of non-payment, and the notary's certificate
attached certified that the notary exhibited the note where pay-
able, at the proper time, and demanded payment which was re-
fused "the answer being no funds, whereof I duly notified the
indorser," an affidavit of defence is sufficient that specifically de-
nies oral service or that notice of dishonor was sent in accord-
ance with the requirements of law, with a positive averment that
no notice was ever received. An old law of 1854 73 was cited,
but the Act was ignored.
Peoples National Bank of Pensacola v. Hazard.'"
A plaintiff who is a bona fide holder of negotiable paper,
without notice of any defect, can recover against the maker, not-
withstanding any equities existing between the maker and the
payee. Old Pennsylvania cases were cited as authority, although
they were anterior to the Negotiable Instruments Law which was
ignored.7
5
Rosenbaum v. Hazard.7 6
When the affidavit of defense of the defendant who was
sued on his cheque nearly six years old, contains no averment
ol loss nor of injury through the delay in suing, the plaintiff can
recover without proving that the defendant suffered no loss nor
injury through such delay, citing Section 322 (186), but not
citing any of the thirteen cases that prior to 1911 had arisen un-
der this section.
Colonial Trust Co. v. Bank of Western Pa."7
The Act of I849,71 giving one who has paid a forged cheque
the right to recover the amount from the one to whom it has
T230 Pa. 261 (igIn).
"Act of Dec. 14, 1855, P. L. 724.
14231 Pa. 552 (0911).
" §§91, 95, 96 (55, 59, 6o).
IT5o Pa. Super. Ct. 5io (192).
"P. L. 424.
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been paid, if prompt notice is given, is not repealed by the Nego-
tiable Instrument Law. Mere payment of the forged cheque
is not acceptance under Section 112 (62), and under Section 220
(132) acceptance must be in writing.
But even without such a law, could not suit be brought for
money had and received?
In Re Young's Estate.
79
Under Sections 96, 116 (57, 66) cited and followed, where
a bank discounted a note made by a wife to her husband's order,
indorsed by him, the bank knowing it was the husband's debt,
and of the lunacy of the husband, the bank takes from the wife
her new note, indorsed by her sister, and after several renewals
thereof the sister dies, her administrator cannot defeat recovery
against her estate on the ground of invralidity of the original note,
as against the wife.
As the result of the examination it is found that in about
one-half of these decisions the Act was entirely ignored as well as
all the cases in other jurisdictions under the same sections of
the same uniform law. This is sufficiently remarkable, but what
is even more remarkable is that in all the cases in which the Act
is cited, in only one case 80 is there a citation of decisions in other
jurisdictions under the Act and in that case but two such decisions
are cited.
It is said that after the Code Napoleon was adopted, the
French courts ignored it for a generation. Is it to take a genera-
tion for our courts to recognize the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law?
To carry out the beneficent purpose of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Bench and the Bar
of this country must do their part. We cannot expect to establish
a body of precedents under a uniform law common to the whole
country (and thus gradually form a national common law so to
speak), unless the courts pay attention to the uniform law and to
79 234 Pa. 287 (1912).
" Wisner v. First Nat. Bk. of Gallitzin, 220 Pa. 21 (19o8).
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the decisions under it in all jurisdictions that have adopted it. To
bring into existence a uniform common law throughout the
country, uniformity in decisions and in opinions is as necessary
as uniformity in legislation.
Amasa M. Eaton.
Providence, R. I.
